Identidad y cooperación en los recursos de uso común
Keywords:
cooperation, identity, common-pool resources, agency, agent-based modelsAbstract
This paper seeks to represent how the identity helps explain cooperation under conditions of common-pool resources (Ostrom, 1990, 2005). Supported by theories of Akerlof (2010), Sen (2006) and Axelrod (2004) and Ostrom (2005) examines the implications and challenges that derive from incorporating multiple identities in an agent-based model (MBA). The identity proves to be a powerful explanatory factor to account for the emergence and evolution of interaction patterns change over time. To observe and reconstruct phenomena such as aggregation in colonies that are individually beneficial and environmentally sustainable. Identity as a force that unites and separates agents, finding solutions helps local and global benefits simultaneously affect individual, collective and environmental.
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